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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF
HIS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
The recent case of Silveus v. Grossman" illustrates an
interesting development in Pennsylvania of the liability of
an employer for the negligence of his independent contractor. In this case the defendant owned a large building
which was destroyed by fire. The wall adjacent to plaintiff's property was left standing in a dangerously insecure
and unsafe condition. The defendant employed one Nolan
to remove the wall, making him an independent contractor.
Nolan, in the course of his work, failed to exercise due
care and as a consequence of his negligence the wall fell,
injuring the plaintiff's property. The question was whether
the defendant, having employed an independent contractor
to do the work, was thereby absolved from liability.
The general rule, relative to the immunity of an employer from responsibility for the acts of his independent
contractor, is firmly established to be that the owner or
occupant of property upon which work is to be done by
another under contract, not as a servant, but as an independent contractor, is not liable for injuries resulting to
third persons from the negligent or wrongful performance
of the work, where there is no want of due care in the
selectioii of such contractor. 2 The plaintiff contended,
however, that the defendant remained liable for the injury
done under an exception to the general rule which was
stated to be: An employer is liable for injuries caused by
the failure of an independent contractor to exercise due care
in respect to the performance of work which is inherently
1102 Pa. Super. Ct. 365 (1931).
2Allen v. Williard, 57 Pa. 374 (1868); Hanison v. Collins, 86 Pa.
153 (1878); Miller v. Merritt, 211 Pa. 127 (1905); Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213 (1863); Brooks v. Buckley & Banks, 291 Pa. 7
(1927); 34 Harv. L. R. 551; 39 C. J. 1324; 23 A. L. R. 1017 et. seq.
An independent contractor has been defined by our Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to be: "One who carries on an independent employment in pursuance of a contract by which he has entire control of
its work and the manner of its performance." Smith v. Simmons, 103
Pa. 32 (1883). Also Bojarski v. Hamlett Inc., 291 Pa. 485, 489 (1928).
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or intrinsically dangerous, unless certain precautions are
used, and liability cannot be evaded by employing an independent contractor to do such work.' It was contended
that the work done was intrinsically or inherently dangerous and that the taking of proper precautions was a nondelegable duty, owing to third persons who may sustain
injuries from the work, and therefore the contractor was
to be considered as agent or servant for whose acts his
employer was responsible. The lower Court applied this
principle of law to the case and a judgment for the plaintiff resulted. On appeal to the Superior Court the judgment was reversed and the general rule as to non-liability
of the employer followed, the court declaring, per Gaw-

throp J.:
"While the statement of law which the court below
applied to this case is in harmony with the decisions of the
courts of some jurisdictions it is not supported by any
decision of our Supreme Court, or this Court, which the industry of counsel or our own examination could discover.
The Supreme Court has consistently held, 'that persons not
personally interfering with or directing the progress of a
work but contracting with third persons to do it, are not
responsible for a wrongful act done or for negligence in
the performance of the contract if the act agreed. upon be
lawful'. Wray v. Evans, 80 Pa. 102, 105. * * * * The rule in
this state is that if the act may be done without causing
actionable injury to third persons or their property, in the
exercise of due care, the independent contractor alone is
liable for the acts done by him or his servants. * * * * The
doctrine, that work which is merely dangerous of itself or
'inherently dangerous' cannot be delegated to an independent contractor, so as to relieve the contractee from reWFor a full statement of this exception and the many states
which follow it, see 39 C,J. 1331 and cases cited thereunder. Also
exhaustive note in 23 A. L. R. 1084, et. seq.
The work is said to be inherently or intrinsically dangerous
when the danger predicated is an unavoidable incident of the performance of the work, 23 A. L. R. 1085. The test is not whether a
man of ordinary prudence would have anticipated the injury, 39 C.
3. 1333.
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sponsibility for the negligence of the contractor, has not
been approved in this state. * * * * Therefore, we are forced
to conclude that the court below fell into error in holding
that the defendants were responsible for the negligence of
their contractor because the work of razing the wall was a
non-delegable duty and the contractor was therefore their
servant for whose acts they were responsible."
This case, being a direct adjudication of the status in
Pennsylvania of this important exception to the general
rule, results signally in a more restricted liability of the
employer of an independent contractor. Under the general rule, if the act may be done by the independent contractor in the exercise of due care, without causing injury,
the contractor alone is liable for his negligence in performing the act, whereas if the exception were recognized the
employer would be held liable for the contractor's negligence, if the work to be done was found by the court and
jury to be inherently or intrinsically dangerous.'
An illustration of an exact opposite holding on almost
identical facts is presented by the case of Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Steinbrook.5 Here the defendant employed an independent contractor to remove a fire wall.
Plaintiff's property was damaged by the contractor's
negligence in taking down the wall. It was held that the
duty was a non-delegable one and that defendant was
liable for the injury. Our court's adherence to the general
rule in the Silveus case is consistent with the prior attitude
dIn 23 A. L.R. 1088 it is suggested that this description in a liter-

al sense is applicable to almost every kind of work and as a matter
of strict logic would compel an adoption of the broad theory that
an employer is ordinarily bound at his peril to see that the stipulated work is carefully performed.
561 Ohio 215, 55 N. E. 618, (1899). The doctrine of this case was
approved and followed in Warden v. Penna. R. R. Co., 175 N. E. 208
(Ohio-1931).
Other fire wall cases in the United States are: Hudgins v. Hann,
240 Fed. 387 (5th Circuit-1917); Steppe v. Alter, 19 So. 147 (La.1896); Anderson v. East, 19 N. E. 726 (Ind.-1888); Ainsworth v.
Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746 (1902); Fitspatrick v. Penfield, 267
Pa. 564 (1920).
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of both Supreme and Superior Court. Thus in the early
case of Painter v. City of Pittsburgh6 the Supreme Court
would brook no exceptions to the general rule declaring,
per Strong J.: "They were in an independent employment
and sound policy demands that in such a case the contractor alone be held liable. * * * * The public will be better
protected if it is held that the contractor alone is responsible for his negligence."
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co. 7 is an outstanding case adhering to the general rule. The defendant under a party
wall statute 8 employed an independent contractor to remove a part of plaintiff's building so as to erect a party
wall on the division line, as provided for and allowed by the
statute. The plaintiff's property was damaged by the contractor's negligence. The plaintiff sued the employer
claiming that he was liable for the injury as an insurer.
Failing this, he claimed that the defendant was, at least
under the circumstances, charged with a non-delegable
duty. He failed in both contentions. The following statement of the trial judge was pronounced to be correct:
(Defendant having employed) "others who were recognized as and proved to skillful and competent in their
professions and having given proper directions * * * * for
the energetic * * * * execution of the work in proper
manner * * * * it is apparent that the defendant is therefore legally relieved from liability in the premises." It is
to be noted that the right to remove the wall was provided
by statute but as there was no statutory liability for the
damages here alleged, the common law remedies attached
which makes the rule of this case applicable to cases in
general.
In Fitzpatrick v. Penfield9 there is dicta to the effect
that, being the owner of a wall left standing after a fire,
the "defendant was charged with a non-delegable duty to
use ordinary care to make her property reasonably safe."
646 Pa. 213 (1883).

'263 Pa. 158, 23 A. L. R. 1053 (1919).
8Act of 1895, P. L. 135.
267 Pa. 564, 570.
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The true import of this statement was explained, however,
in the Silveus case, the court saying:
"In that case the defendant's wall was left standing
after a fire. More than one year later the wall fell and
killed a child. * * * * The defendant sought to excuse her
liability by showing she had experts examine the wall and
that they declared the wall to be safe. She relied on their
opinion and permitted the wall to stand. The Supreme
Court held that her duty to use ordinary care to make her
property reasonably safe * * * * was non-delegable: that is,
as we understand it, the duty was not discharged by obtaining the opinion of experts that the wall was safe and
sound. * * * * The question of whether the work required
to make the wall reasonably safe could be delegated to an
independent contractor, with the usual immunity of the
employer from responsibility for the acts of such a contractor was not invblved in that case."
Another exception to the general non-liability rule
followed in England and some jurisdictions in United
States and most clearly enunciated by Lord Cockburn in
the famous case of Bower v. Peate0 is that: "the duty of an
employer in respect to work which will in the natural course
of events produce injury unless certain precautions are
taken is a non-delegable duty."" As this doctrine is of
even broader application than the one contended for in the
Silveus case, it doubtless would receive no recognition in
Pennsylvania.
Although the exception contended for in the Silveus
case was refused recognition, Pennsylvania does, in common with other jurisdictions, recognize -certain exceptions
to the general rule. Where the act contracted to be done,
10(1876) L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 321. The exception was first enunciated, however, in the earlier case of Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. V. S.
476, 142 Eng. Reprint 536 (1861).
lThis exception is analogous to the one previously named and
little distinction is made by some courts. Historically, however, the
two doctrines have been evolved separately and with relation to
different precedents. For further comment and distinction, see 23
A. L. R. 1084 et. seq.
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as distinguished from the manner of its performance, will
create a nuisance the employer remains liable therefore."2
The same is true where the act to be done is unlawful.
Where the injury results directly from the doing of the
work and not from the negligent manner of its performance the employer remains liable for any injury occasioned thereby,1 3 which rule applies also where the injury
is caused by defective plans or specifications furnished by
the employer. 1 ' It is also held that a duty imposed on the
defendant by statute or municipal ordinance cannot be delegated to an independent contractor so as to relieve the defendant from liability for the wrongful performance of the
work."5 The same is true where the performance of work
is a duty imposed on a corporation by its charter. 6
In conclusion it may be said that Pennsylvania follows
very closely the general rule absolving the employer from
liability for the wrongful or negligent performance of
work done by an independent contractor. The doctrine
that work which is inherently or intrinsically dangerous
cannot be delegated to an independent contractor so as to
relieve the contractee from the duty to use due care in its
performance has been refused recognition in Pennsylvania,
while the cases covered by the other recognized exceptions
are few in number.
SEIBER E. TROUTMAN.
12Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. 32 (1883).
laSilveus v. Grossman, 102 Pa. Super. Ct. 365; 2 Thompson on
Neg. 903.
1
'Rose v. Philadelphia, 31 L. I. 165 (1874).
15
Gray v. Pullen, 5 B. & S. 970; Smith on Neg. p. 88; 34 Harv.
L. R. 551. This rule applies also where certain powers and privileges have been specifically conferred by the public upon an individual or corporation for private emolument in consideration of
which certain duties affecting the public health and safety have
been assumed. Lancaster Ave. Imp. Co. v. Rhoads, 116 Pa. 377
(1887); Fox v. Porter, 6 Pa. Dist. R. 85 (1897).
IsPhiladelphia R. R. Co. v. Hahn, 22 W. N. C. 32 (1888); Pennsylvania and Ohio Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. 290 (1869); Cambria v. Philadelphia R. R. Co., 218 Pa. $4 (1907).

